INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation is not merely a technical exercise. The way courts interpret legislation directly affects people’s rights, dignity, and access to justice. South African courts have increasingly adopted a unified approach to interpretation in which the text, context, purpose, and constitutional values are read together to produce a sensible and lawful outcome.

This approach was central in Road Accident Fund v Mudawo and Others (Case No.: 1185/2024)  and The Road Accident Fund v Lyton and Others (Case No.: 1468/2024) [2026] ZASCA 54 (16 April 2026),¹ where the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) had to determine whether the phrase “any person” in Section 17(1) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (“RAF Act”) includes foreign nationals who are unlawfully present in South Africa.

This article argues that the judgment is an important example of modern statutory interpretation in South Africa.

BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

The matter arose after the Road Accident Fund (“RAF”) introduced a directive requiring foreign claimants to provide proof that they were lawfully present in South Africa at the time of the accident. Similar requirements were later added to the RAF 1 claim form by the Minister of Transport.²

The RAF argued that these measures were necessary to prevent fraud and to ensure compliance with the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (“the Immigration Act”). It further argued that the RAF system was never intended to benefit persons who were unlawfully present in South Africa.³

Several foreign nationals challenged the directive and amended claim form. The SCA confirmed, the finding of the Full Court, that neither the RAF nor the Minister had the authority to limit the scope of Section 17(1) through internal directives or amended claim forms. The SCA found that there was nothing in the wording, purpose, or context of the RAF Act that excluded undocumented foreign nationals from claiming compensation.⁴

The second aspect of the dispute dealt with retrospectivity. The RAF attempted to suspend payment of claims that had already been settled or in respect of which orders of court had already been made, on the basis that the claimants were “undocumented foreign nationals”.⁵ The Court rejected this argument and confirmed that neither the directive nor the amended claim form operated retrospectively.⁶

MODERN APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s application of the modern approach to interpretation. This approach is a unitary exercise; the four considerations set out below are not competing methods, but overlapping dimensions of a single interpretive process:
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1. Literal Interpretation
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   Literal interpretation focuses on the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in legislation.
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   Section 17(1) of the RAF Act provides that the RAF is obliged to compensate “any person” who suffers loss or damage arising from bodily injury caused by the negligent or otherwise wrongful driving of a motor vehicle within the Republic.On a plain reading, the words are broad and unrestricted. The Court confirmed that the word “any” is one of wide meaning unless legislation specifically limits it. Importantly, the Act does not state that only citizens, permanent residents, or documented foreign nationals may claim.⁷.
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   On an ordinary reading of the text, there was therefore no basis for excluding undocumented foreign nationals from the protection of the RAF Act.
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2. Purposive Interpretation
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   Purposive interpretation requires considering the purpose of the legislation as a whole..
   The Court emphasised that the RAF Act constitutes social security legislation aimed at giving the “greatest possible protection” to victims of motor vehicle accidents.
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   The purpose of the RAF is to compensate individuals injured through negligent driving, not to regulate immigration status. Excluding undocumented foreign nationals from the scheme would undermine the very purpose of the Act and deny protection to a vulnerable category of road users.
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   Importantly, the Court also recognised that the RAF system abolished many certain common law claims against drivers and vehicle owners.⁸ This means that victims of road accidents are often entirely dependent on the RAF for compensation. A restrictive interpretation of Section 17(1) would therefore significantly limit access to justice.
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3. Contextual Interpretation
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   Contextual interpretation requires legislation to be read within the broader legislative framework.
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   The RAF argued that the Immigration Act justified excluding undocumented foreign nationals from RAF claims. However, the Court rejected this argument. The Court pointed out that Section 44 of the Immigration Act itself recognises that undocumented foreign nationals remain entitled to services and protections granted under the Constitution or any law. The RAF Act is precisely such a law. The Court further held that processing RAF claims for undocumented foreign nationals does not amount to “aiding or abetting” unlawful immigration under the Immigration Act.⁹
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   Importantly, the broader realities of South Africa’s immigration system also demonstrate the dangers of adopting a rigid interpretation of Section 17(1). In recent years, delays and backlogs within the Department of Home Affairs have significantly affected the processing and renewal of visas, permits, and asylum applications. As a result, some individuals may find themselves in irregular or uncertain immigration positions due to administrative inefficiencies rather than deliberate unlawful conduct..
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   A restrictive interpretation excluding undocumented foreign nationals from RAF protection would therefore risk denying access to justice to individuals whose immigration status may have been affected by systemic failures beyond their control. This becomes particularly significant in light of the RAF scheme’s broader purpose, namely to provide compensation and protection to persons injured through negligent driving.
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   Contextually, the broader legislative framework therefore supported an inclusive interpretation of Section 17(1), rather than a restrictive one.
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4. Constitutional Interpretation
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   Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires that legislation be interpreted in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights..
   The Court found that excluding claimants solely based on immigration status would conflict with constitutional rights such as equality, dignity, and the freedom and security of the person.
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   Importantly, Section 9 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law to “everyone”, not only citizens. The judgment therefore reinforces an important constitutional principle: people do not cease to be rights bearers because of their immigration status.The Court also emphasised that Sections 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution and Section 17(1) of the RAF Act do not distinguish between citizens and undocumented foreign nationals. Had Parliament intended to exclude a category of claimants, it could easily have done so expressly.

LEGALITY AND THE LIMITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is its emphasis on legality – the constitutional principle that all exercises of public power must be authorised by law – and the separation of powers between Parliament and the executive.

The Court held that neither the RAF nor the Minister had the authority to narrow the scope of Section 17(1) through directives or amended claim forms.

Parliament deliberately used broad wording in the RAF Act. Administrative bodies cannot effectively amend legislation through internal policies or administrative processes when the empowering legislation itself contains no such limitation.

The Court reaffirmed that the exercise of public power must remain lawful, rational, and within the bounds of the authority granted by legislation. The directive and amended claim form, therefore, violated the constitutional principle of legality because they attempted to create exclusions that Parliament itself had never enacted.

This aspect of the judgment is particularly important because it serves as a reminder that state institutions cannot bypass the legislative process by narrowing statutory rights through policy decisions.

CONCLUSION

The judgment in The Road Accident Fund v Mudawo and Others is more than a dispute about RAF claims. It serves as an important illustration of how statutory interpretation operates within South African constitutional law and the critical role interpretation plays in protecting constitutional values and ensuring access to justice.

The phrase “any person” in Section 17(1) was ultimately interpreted exactly as it reads: broadly and inclusively. What makes the judgment particularly significant is that, regardless of whether the Court adopted a literal, purposive, contextual, or constitutional approach, each interpretive method pointed toward the same conclusion. The case, therefore, demonstrates that modern statutory interpretation is not confined to isolated or competing methods. Instead, text, purpose, context, and constitutional values operate together to produce a coherent and constitutionally compliant outcome.

By interpreting the provision broadly, the Court reaffirmed that legislation must be construed in a manner that promotes legality, equality, dignity, and access to justice, particularly where vulnerable groups are concerned. The judgment also serves as an important warning against administrative bodies attempting to narrow legislation through directives, policies, or administrative processes where Parliament itself has imposed no such limitation.

Ultimately, the case reinforces a foundational constitutional principle within South African law: rights and legal protections cannot be withheld from vulnerable groups without clear legislative authority.

Please note: Each matter must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and you should consult an attorney before taking any legal action.